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is determined in a repeated probabilistic voting game. We investigate
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1 Introduction
In nearly every country, the government nances the cost of various types
of public goods provision by issuing public debt. Public debt issuance af-
fects patterns of physical capital accumulation, and many studies analyze
its eects on economic growth. In democratic countries, on the other hand,
the amount of public debt issuance is determined through voting processes,
which stimulates a large body of literature investigating the determinants of
public debt issuance in politico-economic frameworks. Building on these two
strands of literature, this paper investigates interactions between politically
implemented public debt policies and patterns of economic development.
Public debt issuance is a type of redistribution policy from younger to
older generations because it imposes its repayment costs on younger gener-
ations. If parental generations are not altruistic toward their children, they
would issue public debt as much as possible and put o scal burdens to
ospring generations. In some countries, however, the amount of public debt
issuance is maintained to be low: the public debt/GDP ratios in Luxem-
bourg, Denmark, and Finland were kept below 60% in 2009.1 Some studies
such as Song et al. (2011) and Rohrs (2010) attempt to explain the mecha-
nism by which public debt issuance is kept down. They construct overlapping
generations models in which the size of public policies is determined through
1The Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria requires EU countries to suppress public
debt to 60% of GDP. In 2009, the public debt/GDP ratio in Luxembourg was below 20%,
and the ratios in Denmark and Finland were around 45% (OECD Outlook 2009).
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voting processes, and investigate the characteristics of Markov perfect equi-
libria. In the equilibria, future public good provision responds negatively to
the amount of public debt issuance, which generates an incentive for individ-
uals to suppress the issuance of public debt: individuals take into account
that an increase in public debt issuance would decrease the level of future
public good provision.
Song et al. (2011) and Rohrs (2010) analyze the intergenerational po-
litical conicts on public debt issuance and obtain many interesting results.
These studies, however, do not explicitly analyze how the extent of economic
development aects the amount of politically implemented public debt is-
suance. Since the capacity of public debt issuance crucially depends on the
scale of the economy, the extent of economic development, such as the level
of physical capital, should have crucial eects on the amount of politically
implemented public debt issuance. Furthermore, they do not analyze the
eects of politically implemented public debt issuance on patterns of eco-
nomic development, especially on physical capital accumulation. Standard
textbooks such as Blanchard and Fischer (1989) mention that public debt
issuance retards physical capital accumulation in a neo-classical growth econ-
omy, and Saint-Paul (1992) shows that an increase in public debt issuance
lowers the rate of economic growth in an endogenous growth framework.2
In contrast to the previous literature, this paper considers an overlapping
2Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) survey the eects of public debt issuance in the short
and long run.
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generations closed economy with physical capital accumulation and investi-
gates the characteristics of a Markov perfect politico-economic equilibrium
in which the size of public policies including public debt issuance depends
not only on the stock of public debt but also on the level of physical capi-
tal. By doing so, we can explicitly analyze interactions between politically
implemented public policies and economic development.
In this paper, individuals live for two periods (young and old) and derive
utility from the consumption of private and public goods in both periods.
When young, they supply labor inelastically and allocate their disposable in-
come between consumption and savings. When old, they retire and consume
the proceeds of their savings. The economy produces a nal good by using
physical capital and labor as inputs, and the technology is represented as a
Romer (1986) type production function. The government nances the cost of
public good provision by levying labor income taxation and/or issuing pub-
lic debt. The size of public good provision, the labor income tax rate, and
public debt issuance is determined in a repeated probabilistic voting game.
When voting, individuals take into account that an increase in the current
public good provision and/or a decrease in the current labor income tax rate
not only accelerate public debt issuance but also retard physical capital ac-
cumulation, and would change the size of public good provision in the next
period.
In this setup, we rst show that there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium
in which the size of public policies is represented by simple functional forms:
4
the size of public good provision and the amount of public debt issuance are
negatively linear with respect to the stock of public debt and positively linear
with respect to the level of physical capital, and the labor income tax rate is
positively linear with respect to the ratio of public debt to physical capital.
In the equilibrium, a rise in the size of current public good provision and/or
a decline in the current labor income tax rate decrease the size of public
good provision in the next period since these accelerate public debt issuance
and retard physical capital accumulation. Thus, there exists an incentive to
suppress public debt issuance. We next analyze the eects of some exogenous
parameters on the size of equilibrium public policies. In particular, we show
that individuals' stronger preferences for public good provision tighten scal
discipline: these raise the equilibrium labor income tax rate and suppress
public debt issuance.
We lastly investigate the patterns of public debt and physical capital ac-
cumulation in the Markov perfect equilibrium. It is shown that the public
debt/physical capital ratio converges to a constant value within one period,
and thereafter, both the stock of public debt and physical capital grow at the
same rate (i.e., balanced growth path). Furthermore, we show that individ-
uals' stronger preferences for public good provision tighten scal discipline
and raise the economic growth rate in the balanced growth path. This re-
sult is consistent with the data from some democratic countries. Using the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as the proxy of the extent of individuals'
preferences for public good provision, we nd a negative relationship between
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CPI and the public debt/GDP ratio. Furthermore, some empirical studies
such as Reinhart and Rogo (2010) and Kumar and Woo (2010) provide ev-
idence indicating that a high public debt/GDP ratio is likely to lower the
economic growth rate. The two observations imply that individuals' stronger
preferences for public good provision lower the public debt/GDP ratio and
promote economic growth.
This paper belongs to a large body of literature investigating the determi-
nants of public debt issuance in politico-economic frameworks. Persson and
Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), and Tabellini and Alesina
(1990) analyze intragenerational political conicts on public debt issuance.
Battaglini and Coate (2008) and Yared (2010) are also related to this strand
of literature. In the literature on optimal scal policy, Ortigueira and Pereira
(2007) investigate the characteristics of optimal income taxation and public
debt policy in a closed economy with physical capital. This paper is also re-
lated to many studies analyzing intergenerational political conicts on social
security (e.g., Forni 2005; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt 2008) and redistribu-
tion policy (e.g., Hassler et al. 2003; Hassler et al. 2007). These studies,
however, assume balanced budget constraints of the governments and do not
consider the determinants of public debt issuance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We characterize a com-
petitive equilibrium in Section 2.1 and investigate the characteristics of a
Markov perfect politico-economic equilibrium in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3,
we analyze the dynamics of the stock of public debt and physical capital. We
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conclude in Section 3.
2 Model
2.1 Competitive Equilibrium
We consider an overlapping generations closed economy in which individuals
are homogeneous within each generation and live for two periods (young
and old). There is no population growth, and the size of each generation is
normalized to one. Individuals derive utility from the consumption of private
and public goods in both periods, and their preferences are represented as
log ct +  log dt+1 +  (log gt +  log gt+1) ;  2 (0; 1);  > 0; (1)
where ct and dt+1 are private consumption when young and old, and gt and
gt+1 are public good consumption when young and old, respectively. The
parameter  represents the degree of individuals' preferences for public good
provision. When young, they supply one unit of labor inelastically and allo-
cate their disposable income between consumption and savings:
ct + st = (1  t)wt; (2)
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where st, wt, and t denote savings, wage, and the labor income tax rate,
respectively. When old, they retire and consume the return on their savings:
dt+1 = Rt+1st; (3)
where Rt+1 is the interest rate. As economic agents, individuals choose con-
sumption and savings in order to maximize their utility subject to (2) and
(3), taking wt; Rt+1; t; gt, and gt+1 as given. From the utility-maximization
problem, we obtain
ct =
1
1 + 
(1  t)wt; dt+1 = Rt+1ct ; (4)
st =

1 + 
(1  t)wt: (5)
A nal good is produced by using physical capital and labor as inputs, and
the technology is represented by a Romer (1986) type production function:
yt = Ak

t l
1 
t
k1 t ; (6)
where kt and lt are inputs of physical capital and labor, respectively, and kt
is the aggregate physical capital. Physical capital fully depreciates within
one period. Each rm chooses kt and lt in order to maximize prot, taking
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kt, Rt, and wt as given. All markets are competitive, which leads to
Rt = A; (7)
wt = (1  )Akt; (8)
yt = Akt: (9)
In the competitive equilibrium, the wage and the output are proportional to
the level of physical capital.
The government nances the cost of public good provision by levying
labor income tax and/or issuing public debt. The budget constraint of the
government is given by
bt+1 = Rtbt + gt   twt; (10)
where bt is the stock of public debt. We assume that the government cannot
repudiate public debt and does not hold positive assets (i.e., bt+1  0).
The capital market clearing condition is represented as
kt+1 = st   bt+1: (11)
From (7), (10), and (11), we obtain the transition equations of the state
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variables:
bt+1 = Abt + gt   (1  )Atkt
 ZB(gt; t; bt; kt);
(12)
kt+1 =

1 + 
(1  )Akt + 1
1 + 
(1  )Atkt   Abt   gt
 ZK(gt; t; bt; kt):
(13)
An increase in current public good provision accelerates public debt issuance
and retards physical capital accumulation (i.e., @ZB=@g > 0 and @ZK=@g <
0). In contrast, an increase in current labor income tax rate suppresses public
debt issuance and promotes physical capital accumulation (i.e., @ZB=@ < 0
and @ZK=@ > 0).
2.2 Politico-economic Equilibrium
2.2.1 Markov perfect equilibrium
We next investigate the characteristics of a politico-economic equilibrium.
employing a probabilistic voting model a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
Under probabilistic voting, the size of public policies is determined to max-
imize the weighted sum of voters' welfare. The welfare of young individuals
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and that of old individuals are represented as, respectively,
V y(gt; t; bt; kt; gt+1) = C
y + (1 + ) log kt + (1 + ) log(1  t)
+  flog gt +  log gt+1g ;
(14)
V o(gt; bt; kt) = C
o + log(kt + bt) +  log gt; (15)
where Cy and Co are constant variables. From (14) and (15), the weighted
sum of the welfare is given by
W (gt; t; bt; kt; gt+1)  !V y(gt; t; bt; kt; gt+1) + (1  !)V o(gt; bt; kt)
= C + !(1 + ) log kt + (1  !) log(kt + bt)
+ !(1 + ) log(1  t) + [log gt + ! log gt+1];
(16)
where C  !Cy + (1  !)Co, and ! 2 [0; 1] is the weight attached to young
individuals.
In order to investigate the interactions between politically implemented
public policies and the patterns of economic growth, we focus on a Markov
perfect equilibrium, in which the size of public policies depends only on
the payo-relevant state variables. In this paper, the payo-relevant state
variables are the stock of public debt, bt, and physical capital, kt. Thus the
size of public good provision, gt, the labor income tax rate, t, and the size
of public debt issuance, bt+1, are represented as functions of these two state
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variables:
gt = G(bt; kt); t = T (bt; kt); bt+1 = B(bt; kt): (17)
In the Markov perfect equilibrium, individuals take into account that current
public policies, gt and t, aect the stock of public debt, bt+1, and physical
capital, kt+1, in the next period, and would aect the size of public good
provision, gt+1, in the next period.
Since public debt issuance retards physical capital accumulation, an ex-
tremely large amount of public debt relative to physical capital will discreate
the economy. In particular, when bt=kt  (1   )=, the level of physical
capital in the next period, kt+1, becomes non-positive even if the government
supplies no public good and sets the labor income tax rate as high as possible
(i.e., gt = 0 and t = 1). We thus restrict the domain of state variables as
follows:
S 

(b; k) : 0  b; 0 < k; b
k
<
1  


:
The Markov perfect equilibrium is characterized by the following functional
equation:
(G(b; k); T (b; k)) = arg max
g0;2[0;1]
W (g; ; b; k; g0);
subject to
b0 = ZB(g; ; b; k); k0 = ZK(g; ; b; k); g0 = G(b0; k0); (b0; k0) 2 S;
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and
B(b; k) = Ab+G(b; k)  (1  )AT (b; k)k:
In order to make our model tractable and obtain some interesting results,
we focus on a situation in which the size of public good provision is repre-
sented as a linear function of the stock of public debt and physical capital.
We guess that the function G is given by
g0 = G(b0; k0) = 1k0   2b0; (18)
where 1 and 2 are positive coecients. The rst-order condition with re-
spect to g is given by

g|{z}
MBg
=
!
g0
(1 + 2)| {z }
MCg
: (19)
The left-hand side of (19) is the marginal benet of increasing g, which
results from an increase in current public good provision. The right-hand
side is the marginal cost of increasing g: an increase in g accelerates public
debt issuance, b0, and lowers the level of physical capital in the next period,
k0, which implies a decrease in the size of public good provision in the next
period, g0. The rst-order condition with respect to  is given by
!(1 + )
1  | {z }
MC
=
!
g0

1
1 + 
+ 2

(1  )Ak| {z }
MB
: (20)
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The left-hand side of (20) is the marginal cost of increasing  , which results
from a reduction in the disposable income of young individuals. The right-
hand side is the marginal benet of increasing  : an increase in  suppresses
public debt issuance, b0, and raises the level of physical capital in the next
period, k0, which implies an increase in public good provision in the next
period, g0. Solving simultaneous functional equations (19) and (20) with
respect to g, we obtain
g =

(1 + !) + !(1 + )
[(1  )Ak   Ab]  G(b; k) > 0 8(b; k) 2 S:
(21)
Comparing the coecients of (18) with those of (21), we obtain
1 =
(1  )A
(1 + !) + !(1 + )
; 2 =
A
(1 + !) + !(1 + )
:
Substituting g of (21) into (20), we obtain
 = 1  !(1 + )
2
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]

1  
1  
b
k

 T (b; k): (22)
Furthermore, substituting g of (21) and  of (22) into the transition equation
of b, we obtain
b0 = Rb+G(b; k)  wT (b; k)k
=
![(1  )(1 + )  (1 + )]
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]
[(1  )Ak   Ab]  B(b; k):
(23)
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The results mentioned above are summarized as the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the parameters satisfy
!(1  )(1 + )
(1 + )(1 + !)
   (1  )(1 + )
1 + 
; (A.1)
then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium in which the size of public good
provision, the labor income tax rate, and the amount of public debt issuance
are, respectively, represented as (21), (22), and (23).
(A.1) ensures that the labor income tax rate given by (22) and the amount
of public debt issuance given by (23) are nonnegative for any (b; k) 2 S. By
substituting g of (21) and  of (22) into the transition equation of k, we can
show that the level of physical capital in the next period becomes positive in
the Markov perfect equilibrium:
k0 =
![(1 + ) + (1 + )]
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]
[(1  )Ak   Ab] > 0 8(b; k) 2 S:
(24)
Furthermore, from (23) and (24), we obtain
b0
k0
=
(1  )(1 + )  (1 + )
(1 + ) + (1 + )
<
1  

: (25)
Thus (b0; k0) 2 S as long as the parameters satisfy (A.1).
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2.2.2 Properties of policy functions
The Markov perfect equilibrium policy functions given by (21), (22), and (23)
have the following properties. First, whereas the tax function T is increasing
in the stock of public debt, b, the public good provision function G and
the public debt issuance function B are decreasing in b. A large amount of
public debt raises the labor income tax rate, reduces the size of public good
provision, and suppresses public debt issuance.3 Second, whereas the tax
function T is decreasing in the level of physical capital, k, the public good
provision function G and the public debt issuance function B are increasing
in k. A high level of physical capital expands the capacity of public debt
issuance and loosens scal discipline.
We here consider the intuition about the properties of the public good
provision function G. Suppose that the size of public policies except for
current public good provision is given by the Markov perfect policy rule;
i.e.,  = T (b; k) and g0 = G(b0; k0). Then, the marginal benet and cost of
increasing g are represented as, respectively,
MBg =

g
; (26)
MCg =
!A
(1 + !) + !(1 + )
1
g0
=
!
(1  )k0   b0 : (27)
Note that a high level of physical capital in the next period, k0, and/or a
3This result is similar to that of Song et al. (2011).
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small amount of public debt issuance, b0, increase the size of public good
provision in the next period, g0, and thus lower the marginal cost. In what
follows, we investigate the features of the marginal benet and cost.
First, from (22), the tax revenue T^ is represented by
T^  wT (b; k)k
=
!(1 + )2
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]
Ab
+
(1 + )(1 + !)  !(1  )(1 + )
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]
(1  )Ak:
(28)
The tax revenue is increasing in b since a large amount of public debt raises
the equilibrium tax rate, T . The tax revenue is also increasing in k. Whereas
an increase in the level of physical capital lowers the equilibrium tax rate,
T , it expands the tax base, wk. Under (A.1), the latter eect dominates the
former one, and a high level of physical capital increases the tax revenue.
Substituting T^ of (28) into the transition equations of b and k, we obtain
b0 = Rb+ g   T^ (b; k); (29)
k0 =

1 + 
wk +
1
1 + 
T^ (b; k) Rb  g: (30)
Dierentiating b0 and k0 with respect to b, we obtain
@b0
@b
= R  @T^
@b
=
(1 + )(1 + !)  !(1  )(1 + )
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]
A > 0;
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@k0
@b
=
1
1 + 
@T^
@b
 R =  (1 + )(1 + !) + !(1 + )
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]
A < 0:
Whereas a large amount of public debt increases the tax revenue, T^ , it also
increases the repayment cost of public debt, Rb. In our setup, the latter eect
dominates the former one, and thus, b0 and k0 are increasing and decreasing
in b, respectively. In contrast, b0 and k0 are decreasing and increasing in k,
respectively, since a high level of physical capital increases the tax revenue,
T^ .
We proceed to analyze the features of the marginal cost and benet. First,
whereas the marginal benet, MBg, is independent of b, the marginal cost,
MCg, is increasing in b: a large amount of public debt accelerates public
debt issuance, b0, lowers the level of physical capital in the next period, k0,
and raises the marginal cost. Thus, an increase in b lowers the level of public
good provision equalizing the cost with the benet, which implies that the
function G is decreasing in b (see Figure 1.a). Second, whereas the marginal
benet is independent of k, the marginal cost is decreasing in k: a high
level of physical capital suppresses public debt issuance, b0, raises the level of
physical capital in the next period, k0, and hence lowers the marginal cost.
Thus, an increase in k raises the level of public good provision equalizing the
cost with the benet, which implies that the function G is increasing in k
(see Figure 1.b).
We next consider the intuition about the properties of the equilibrium tax
function T . Suppose that the size of public policies except for the current
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Figure 1: Properties of the Function G
labor income tax rate is given by the Markov perfect policy rule; i.e., g =
G(b; k) and g0 = G(b0; k0). The marginal cost and benet of increasing  are
represented as, respectively,
MC =
!(1 + )
1   ; (31)
MB =
!(1 + )
(1  )(1 + )
1
k^0   
1  b^
0 ; (32)
where b^0  b0=(wk) and k^0  k0=(wk) are the ratio of public debt issuance to
wage and the ratio of physical capital in the next period to wage, respectively.
We then denote the ratio of public good provision to wage by G^:
G^  G(b; k)
wk
=

(1 + !) + !(1 + )

1  
1  
b
k

: (33)
The public good/wage ratio, G^, is increasing in k: a high level of physical
capital increases the size of public good provision more elastically than the
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wage. In contrast , G^ is decreasing in b since a large amount of public debt
reduces the size of public good provision, G. Substituting G^ of (33) into the
transition equations of b and k, we obtain
b^0 =
Rb
wk
+ G^  ; (34)
k^0 =

1 + 
+
1
1 + 
   Rb
wk
  G^: (35)
Dierentiating b^0 and k^0 with respect to b, we obtain
@b^0
@b
=
@
@b

Rb
wk

+
@G^
@b
=
!(1 +  + )
(1 + !) + !(1 + )

1  
1
k
> 0;
@k^0
@b
=   @
@b

Rb
wk

  @G^
@b
=   !(1 +  + )
(1 + !) + !(1 + )

1  
1
k
< 0:
While a large amount of public debt lowers the public good/wage ratio,
G^, it raises the repayment cost/wage ratio, (Rb)=(wk). In our setup, the
latter eect dominates the former one, and thus, b^0 and k^0 are increasing and
decreasing in b, respectively. Dierentiating b^0 and k^0 with respect to k, we
obtain
@b^0
@k
=
@
@k

Rb
wk

+
@G^
@k
=   !(1 +  + )
(1 + !) + !(1 + )

1  
b
k2
< 0;
@k^0
@k
=   @
@k

Rb
wk

  @G^
@k
=
!(1 +  + )
(1 + !) + !(1 + )

1  
b
k2
> 0:
Whereas a high level of physical capital raises the public good/wage ratio,
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Figure 2: Properties of the Function T
G^, it lowers the repayment cost/wage ratio, (Rb)=(wk). Since the latter
eect dominates the former one, b^0 and k^0 are decreasing and increasing in k,
respectively.
We proceed to investigate the features of the marginal cost and bene-
t. First, while the marginal cost is independent of b, the marginal benet
is increasing in b: a large amount of public debt raises the public debt is-
suance/wage ratio, b^0, lowers the ratio of the physical capital in the next
period to wage, k^0, and thus raises the marginal benet. Thus, an increase
in b raises the labor income tax rate equalizing the cost with the benet,
which implies that the function T is increasing in b (see Figure 2.a). Second,
while the marginal cost is independent of k, the marginal benet is decreas-
ing in k: a high level of physical capital lowers b^0, raises k^0, and thus lowers
the marginal benet. Thus, an increase in k lowers the labor income tax
rate equalizing the cost with the benet, which means that the function T is
decreasing in k (see Figure 2.b).
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2.2.3 Comparative statics
The features of the equilibrium policy functions given by (21), (22), and
(23) also depend on some exogenous parameters. For instance, individuals'
stronger preferences for public good provision, , raise not only the level of
public good provision, G, but also the labor income tax rate, T . Furthermore,
in our setup, a rise in  increases the tax revenue more elastically than the
level of public good provision, and thus suppresses public debt issuance, B.4
In contrast, an increase in the weight attached to young individuals, !, lowers
not only the level of public good provision, G, but also the labor income tax
rate, T . Since the latter eect dominates the former one, an increase in !
accelerates public debt issuance, B.5
In order to analyze the eects of the exogenous parameters on the feature
of the public good provision function, G, suppose that the size of public
policies except for current public good provision is given by the Markov
perfect policy rule. The tax revenue T^ given by (28) is increasing in  and
decreasing in !, since an increase in  and/or a decrease in ! raises the
equilibrium tax rate, T . Whereas an increase in  suppresses public debt
issuance, b0, and raises the level of physical capital in the next period, k0,
an increase in !, increases b0 and reduces k0. We next analyze the eects of
the exogenous parameters on the marginal benet and cost of increasing in
4By dierentiating B of (23) with respect to , it is shown that the function B is
decreasing in .
5By dierentiating B of (23) with respect to !, it is shown that the function B is
increasing in ! under (A.2).
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g. First, an increase in  raises both the marginal benet and cost directly,
but lowers only the marginal cost indirectly: it reduces public debt issuance,
b0, and raises the level of physical capital in the next period, k0, and thus
indirectly lowers the marginal cost. Thus, an increase in  raises the benet
more elastically than the cost and raises the level of public good provision
equalizing the cost with the benet, which implies that the function G is
increasing in . Second, while the marginal benet is independent of !,
the marginal cost is increasing !: an increase in ! raises the marginal cost
directly, accelerates public debt issuance, b0, and lowers the level of physical
capital in the next period, k0. Thus, an increase in ! lowers the level of public
good provision equalizing the cost with the benet, which implies that the
function G is decreasing in !.
As for the eects of the exogenous parameters on the feature of the tax
function T , suppose that the size of public policies except for current labor
income tax rate is given by the Markov perfect policy rule. The ratio of public
good provision to wage, G^, given by (33), is increasing in  and decreasing
in ! since an increase in  and/or a decrease in ! raises the level of public
good provision, G. Whereas an increase in  raises b^0 and lowers k^0, an
increase in ! lowers b^0 and raises k^0. We lastly analyze the eects of the
exogenous parameters on the marginal benet and cost of increasing  . The
marginal cost is independent of , but the marginal benet is increasing in
: an increase in  raises the marginal benet directly, lowers b^0 and raises
k^0. Thus, an increase in  raises the labor income tax rate equalizing the
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cost with the benet, which implies that the function T is increasing in
. Furthermore, an increase in ! raises both the marginal benet and cost
directly, but it lowers only the marginal benet indirectly: it lowers b^0, raises
k^0, and thus lowers the marginal benet. Since an increase in ! raises the
marginal cost more elastically than the marginal benet, it lowers the labor
income tax rate equalizing the cost with the benet, which implies that the
function T is decreasing in !.
2.3 Dynamics and Economic Growth
In this section, we investigate the dynamic pattern of public debt and physical
capital accumulation in the Markov perfect equilibrium described in proposi-
tion 1. Note rst that (25) states that the public debt/physical capital ratio
in the next period becomes constant for any (bt; kt) 2 S:
bt+1
kt+1
=
(1  )(1 + )  (1 + )
(1 + ) + (1 + )
 z: (36)
The public debt/physical capital ratio converges to z within one period, and
thereafter, the stock of public debt and physical capital grow at the same
rate; i.e., a balanced growth path (BGP). The ratio z is decreasing in the
degree of individuals' preferences for public good provision, , because an
increase in  raises the level of physical capital in the next period, k0, more
elastically than the amount of public debt issuance, b0.
We lastly analyze the eects of the exogenous parameters on the pattern
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of economic growth. The growth rate of physical capital in the BGP is given
by
kt+1
kt

bt=kt=z
= (1  )A


1 + 
+
1
1 + 
    
1  z   g^


= (1  )A ![(1 + ) + (1 + )]
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]

1  
1  z

=
!A
(1 + !) + !(1 + )
;
(37)
where   and g^ are the labor income tax rate and the public good/wage
ratio in the BGP:
  = 1  !(1 + )
2
(1 + )[(1 + !) + !(1 + )]

1  
1  z

; (38)
g^ =

(1 + !) + !(1 + )

1  
1  z

: (39)
From a simple calculation, this growth rate is shown to be increasing in the
strength of individuals' preferences for public good provision, . An increase
in  lowers the public debt/physical capital ratio, z, and tends to raise the
growth rate. In addition, taking z as given, an increase in  raises the labor
income tax rate,  , and raises the public good/wage ratio, g^. In our setup,
the sum of the rst and second eects dominates the third one, and thus,
the growth rate is increasing in . It is also shown that the growth rate of
physical capital is increasing in the weight attached to young individuals, !.
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An increase in ! lowers not only the labor income tax rate,  , but also the
public good/wage ratio, g^. Since the latter eect dominates the former one,
an increase in ! raises the growth rate. We summarize the results obtained
in this section as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the BGP, the public debt/physical capital ratio is decreas-
ing in , and the economic growth rate is increasing in  and !.
As mentioned above, individuals' stronger preferences for public good
provision tighten scal discipline and promote economic growth. This result
is consistent with the data from some democratic countries. Like Song et al.
(2011), we focus on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as the proxy of
the extent of individuals' preference for public good provision. In less-corrupt
countries, wherein CPI is high, individuals are likely to trust the government
and to have strong preferences for public good provision. In corrupt countries,
wherein CPI is low, the government cannot win the condence of individuals,
and the strength of individuals' preferences for public good provision are
likely to be low.
Using the CPI data for 2011 and the OECD outlook data for 1995{2006,
we nd a positive correlation between the total tax revenue/GDP ratio and
CPI and a negative correlation between the public debt/GDP ratio and CPI.6
While the average of the tax revenue/GDP ratio and that of the gross general
government debt/GDP ratio in the high-CPI group are 18.37 % and 50.87
6Song et al. (2011) also argue that the central government debt/GDP ratio is negatively
correlated with the strength of individuals' preferences for public good provision.
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%, respectively, those in the low-CPI group are 9.675 % and 73.34 %, respec-
tively.7 Furthermore, some empirical studies such as Reinhart and Rogo
(2010) and Kumar and Woo (2010) argue that the economic growth rate is
negatively correlated with the public debt/GDP ratio.8 Taking account of
the negative relationship between the public debt/GDP ratio and CPI, indi-
viduals' stronger preferences for public good provision are likely to promote
economic growth.
3 Conclusion
We construct a simple overlapping generations economy with physical capi-
tal accumulation in which the size of public policies including public debt is-
suance is determined in a repeated probabilistic voting game. We investigate
interactions between politically implemented public policies and patterns of
economic development by focusing on a Markov perfect equilibrium and show
that individuals' stronger preferences for public good provision tighten scal
discipline and promote economic growth.
We conclude by discussing possible directions for future research. First, in
7We include countries with CPI higher than 8.0 in the high-CPI group (New Zealand,
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland, Canada, and
Luxembourg) and countries with CPI lower than 7.0 in the low-CPI group (Spain, Portu-
gal, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Italy, and Greece).
8Reinhart and Rogo (2010) present a new time-series dataset of public debt and show
that the economic growth rate in countries with a public debt/GDP ratio higher than 90
% tend to be lower than those in the other countries. Using several estimation methods,
Kumar and Woo (2010) show that an increase in the initial public debt/GDP ratio lowers
the economic growth rate.
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addition to increasing individuals' welfare directly, public goods can raise the
productivity of production as mentioned in Barro (1990). Considering the
productivity-enhancing eect of public goods might shed light on dierent
characteristics of the politico-economic equilibria from ours. Furthermore,
this paper considers a simple tax system comprising only labor income tax-
ation. A natural extension is to investigate the characteristics of Markov
perfect equilibria under more general tax systems that include, for instance,
capital income and consumption taxation.
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